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Abstract—In order to obtain good network performance in
Long Term Evolution-Advanced (LTE-A) heterogeneous net-
works (HetNets), enhanced inter-cell interference coordination
(eICIC) and further enhanced inter-cell interference coordination
(FeICIC) have been proposed by LTE standardization bodies
to address the entangled inter-cell interference and the user
association problems. We propose distributed algorithms based
on the exact potential game framework for both eICIC and
FeICIC optimizations. We demonstrate via simulations a 64%
gain on energy efficiency (EE) achieved by eICIC and another
17% gain on EE achieved by FeICIC. We also show that FeICIC
can bring other significant gains in terms of cell-edge throughput,
spectral efficiency (SE) and fairness among user throughputs.
Moreover, we propose a downlink scheduler based on a cake-
cutting algorithm that can further improve the performance of
the optimization algorithms compared to conventional schedulers.
Index Terms—LTE/LTE-A, heterogeneous networks, resource
allocation, distributed optimization, potential game.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to an estimate of the growth of mobile data
volume [1], more capacity must be added to the current cellular
networks. Cell densification, due to its ability of reusing spec-
trum geographically and its property of preserving signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) [2], serves as a promising
candidate solution to meet the demand of mobile users [3].
Contrary to the traditional cell densification where more high-
power base stations (BSs) are added, it is more practical to
add low-power BSs due to the high cost of installing macro
BSs and the shortage of available sites suitable for macro BSs
[4], which gives rise of the development of heterogeneous
networks (HetNets).
The emergence of HetNets gives rise to two challenging net-
work management problems. First, because pico BSs transmit
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at low power levels compared to macro BSs, mobile users
who are physically located near pico BSs may be attracted
to macro BSs, which can create underutilized pico BSs and
overcrowded macro BSs. Therefore, in order to fully utilize
the available resources in BSs with different transmission
power, careful treatment is needed when performing user
association. Second, the surrounding macro BSs of a pico BS
can generate large interference to a user associated to the pico
BS, and such inter-cell interference must be well-managed
in order to prevent pico BSs’ users from suffering very low
downlink throughputs. To solve these issues, enhanced inter-
cell interference coordination (eICIC) has been proposed in
Release-10 of the 3GPP LTE standards, where
1) Cell selection bias (CSB) is used to offset the received
signal power from BSs to a user so that a user is not
necessarily associated with the BS that provides the
strongest received power, and
2) Almost blank subframe (ABS) can be configured in
macro BSs so that the macro BSs cease data transmis-
sions in certain time slots, which reduces interference to
pico BSs.
The use of ABSs can help reduce the interference from
macro BSs to pico BSs. However, the restriction that macro
BSs must mute their data transmissions entirely in ABSs
may result in the inefficient use of the increasingly scarce
resources. In Release-11, further enhanced inter-cell interfer-
ence coordination (FeICIC) has been proposed, where instead
of offering ABSs, macro BSs allocate reduced power almost
blank subframes (RP-ABSs) to serve their users at reduced
power levels.
Clearly, the configurations of CSB values and ABS patterns
in eICIC optimization are coupled, because the amount of
ABSs depends on the load on pico BSs which depends on the
CSB values. To achieve the maximum possible performance
gain using eICIC, joint optimization in ABS patterns and CSB
values is required. Similarly, we must jointly consider RP-ABS
patterns and CSB values when doing FeICIC optimization.
While eICIC optimization algorithms have been studied in
[5]–[15], little attention is paid on the algorithm that performs
FeICIC optimization.
In this paper, we propose an exact potential game framework
that is suitable for performing both eICIC and FeICIC opti-
mizations. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
1) A distributed optimization framework: Based on the
exact potential game framework, we propose a scalable
distributed algorithm that can either jointly optimize
2ABS and CSB patterns or jointly optimize RP-ABS and
CSB patterns. The game theoretic framework can adapt
itself to various system optimization targets, such as
proportional fairness (PF) and sum rate maximization.
2) Performance evaluation: We evaluate the performance
gain due to FeICIC and eICIC optimizations. Simula-
tion results show that, compared to the case when no
optimization is performed, FeICIC can nearly double
the energy efficiency (EE) while eICIC provides about a
64% improvement on EE. Also, FeICIC provides higher
fairness in the throughputs of the users and better cell-
edge throughputs compared to eICIC.
3) A better downlink scheduler: We propose a downlink
scheduler based on a cake-cutting algorithm. Simulation
results show that the proposed scheduler can further
improve the EE and spectral efficiency (SE) by 10%
compared to conventional schedulers, can provide better
fairness in SE, and is about 20 times faster than con-
ventional convex algorithms in terms of simulation run
time.
A. Related work
A number of eICIC optimization algorithms have been pro-
posed in the literature. Tall et al.’s algorithm in [5] decouples
the ABS optimization and CSB optimization, where the ABS
patterns are simplified as fractional numbers. A centralized
algorithm is proposed by Deb et al. in [6], where ABS and
CSB patterns are jointly optimized and the surrounding macro
BSs of a pico BS must offer ABSs on the same subframes. In
[7], a distributed algorithm is proposed by Pang et al. where
the number of ABSs is determined without considering CSB.
Thakur et al. considered the problem of CSB optimization and
power control in [8]. Bedekar and Agrawal, in [9], simplify
the joint ABS and CSB optimization problem so that the
optimization of ABS ratios and user attachment are solved
separately. Simsek et al. propose a learning algorithm that
optimizes CSB patterns in frequency domain in [10] and
further extend the idea to optimizing CSB patterns in both
time and frequency domain in [11]. Liu et al., in [12],
propose to optimize the probability that a macro BS offers
almost blank resource blocks on both time and frequency
dimensions. Potential game based solutions for distributed
eICIC optimization are considered in [13]–[15].
The benefit of FeICIC against eICIC has been analyzed in
[16] using stochastic geometric approach, where the expres-
sions for SE and cell-edge throughputs have been derived as
a function of the power reduction factor on the RP-ABSs.
However, the power reduction factor on all RP-ABSs are
assumed to be the same in [16]. An optimization algorithm
that can dynamically adjust the transmission power on each
RP-ABS has not been considered to our best knowledge.
In this work, we address the FeICIC optimization problem
based on exact potential game models. We adapt the game
theoretic frameworks in [14], [15] such that power control
on each time-frequency slot, i.e., physical resource block
(PRB), are included during the optimization process. Also, we
rigorously discuss the necessary assumptions which are needed
for the validity of the exact potential game formulations
and evaluate the effect of such assumptions. Moreover, we
evaluate the performance of a downlink scheduler based on
a cake-cutting algorithm and compare it against conventional
schedulers.
B. Organization and notation
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II gives the system model of the LTE-A HetNets. Section
III formulates the eICIC and FeICIC optimization problems.
Section IV develops the exact potential game framework that
is suitable for eICIC and FeICIC optimizations. Section V
describes the strategy sets and the better response dynamics
of the games for eICIC and FeICIC optimization. Section
VI introduces the cake-cutting downlink scheduler and other
benchmark schedulers. Section VII presents the numerical
studies. Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
Unless otherwise specified, we use small letters such as a to
denote scalars, bold small letters such as a to denote vectors,
calligraphy letters such as A to denote sets. Also, jAj returns
the number of elements in set A and ; denotes the empty set.
A n B gives the elements in set A that are not in set B.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a randomly generated HetNet as shown in Fig. 1
which consists of macro BSs and pico BSs, where the squares
represent macro BSs and the triangles represent pico BSs.
Denote M and P as the set of all macro BSs and the set
of all pico BSs, respectively. Also, denote Mc and Pc as
the macro BSs in the center cluster of the HetNet and pico
BSs in the center cluster of the HetNet, respectively, where
the center cluster is surrounded by bolded borders in Fig. 1.
Six clusters which are identical to the center clusters are
placed around the center cluster. We make such distinction
between the center cluster and other clusters because we only
care about the optimization of the BSs in the center cluster,
and the surrounding clusters are generated only to realize the
interference as encountered in practice. We assume that there
is only one macro BS located at the center of each hexagon,
and each hexagon has the same number of pico BSs, e.g., one
pico BS per hexagon in Fig. 1.
Let N (i; n) be BS i’s neighboring BSs that are located in
the n-th layer of hexagons w.r.t.1 the hexagon in which BS
i is located, where i 2 M [ P . The 0-th layer of hexagons
w.r.t. the hexagon  is  itself, and the n-th layer of hexagons
w.r.t.  are the hexagons
1) that are adjacent to the (n  1)-th layer of hexagons of
, and
2) that are further away from  than the hexagons of the
(n  1)-th layer.
For example, in Fig. 1, N (1; 0) gives f101g,
N (101; 0) gives f1g, both N (1; 1) and N (101; 1) give
f2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 102; 103; 104; 105; 106; 107g, and both
N (1; 2) and N (101; 2) give the set of BSs in the center
cluster except the BSs in f1; 101g [ N (1; 1). The definition
1w.r.t. stands for with respect to.
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Fig. 1: An example of a hexagonal HetNet layout. The squares
represent the macro BSs and the triangles represent the pico
BSs. Users are not displayed for the sake of clarity.
of N (i; n) can also be easily extended to the case where i
represents a set of BSs located in the same hexagon.
Let U be the set of all users in the system. Denote mu as
the macro BS that is located in the same hexagon as user u.
We assume that only the BSs in the same hexagon or in the
adjacent hexagons can serve a user. In other words, the set of
candidate BSs that can serve user u is given as:
Ou , fmug [ N (mu; 0) [N (mu; 1):
Define vector Ou as the CSB values of all BSs in Ou and
let Ou(i) gives the CSB value of BS i, where i 2 Ou. The
set C contains all possible values that Ou(i) can take. Let
PRxi;u be the reference signal received power (RSRP) of user u
from BS i when the BS is transmitting at its full power. The
exact value of PRxi;u depends on the distance between BS i and
user u and the loss due to shadow fading. The effect of fast
fading is assumed to be averaged out for PRxi;u. The following
equation gives the BS that serves user u:
g(u;Ou) , arg max
i2Ou
(PRxi;u + Ou(i)): (1)
Let UB be the set of users who are associated with BSs in the
set B, i.e.,
UB , fujg(u;Ou) 2 Bg:
Clearly, UB is a function of the CSB values of the BSs in B
and their nearby BSs. Let  denote the vector which specifies
all BS’s CSB values.
Suppose each BS has NT subframes in the time domain
and NF resource blocks (RBs) in the frequency domain. All
subframes have the same duration and all RBs are identical in
terms of bandwidth. A PRB is formed by a pair of subframe
and RB, and we denote NB := NT NF as the total number
of PRBs available at each BS. It is assumed that all subframes
and RBs of all BSs are synchronized.
Let the length NT vector m specify the ABS pattern
of macro BS m, where all the entries in m are binary.
Let A contain all possible ABS patterns that a macro BS
can adopt, where each element in A consists of a binary
vector of length NT . Also, let A^ be a subset of f1; 2; :::; NT g
which contains the indices of subframes which can be an
ABS as indicated in any element in A. For example, suppose
A = f(0; 1; 1; 1); (0; 1; 0; 1); (0; 0; 0; 1)g, then A^ = f1; 2; 3g
because subframes 1, 2, and 3 are possible ABSs.
Let (b) be the subframe index of PRB b. Moreover, let ^m
be a vector of length NT  NF whose elements specify the
power allocation of macro BS m on each PRB, where ^m(b)
is a real number between 0 and 1 for (b) 2 A^ and ^m(b) is
fixed to be one for (b) 2 f1; 2; :::; NT g n A^. The vector ^m
then defines the RP-ABS pattern of macro BS m. Note that
although it is not necessary to assume that a macro BS offers
RP-ABS only in the subframes specified by A^, the definition
of ^m aims at offering a fair comparison between FeICIC
optimization and eICIC optimization.
In this paper, we assume that only the macro BSs would
offer ABSs/RP-ABSs while the pico BSs always transmit on
all subframes. Such an assumption is reasonable because
1) The macro BSs have much more transmission power
than the pico BSs. Consequently, the macro BSs are the
main source of interference in the network.
2) The complexity of the resulting eICIC/FeICIC optimiza-
tion is reduced compared to the case where all stations
offer ABSs/RP-ABSs.
Also, we assume that only the pico BSs may set their CSB
values to some positive numbers while the macro BSs fix their
CSB values to zeros. This is because, in general, it is the
coverage range of a pico BS which needs to be extended in
order to better utilize the resources from the pico BS.
Given the above definitions, the signal-to-noise-plus-
interference ratio (SINR) of user u on PRB b when associated
with macro BS m can be calculated as:
SINRmu;b=
8>>><>>>:
hmu;bP
Rx
m;um((b))
P IFIm;u;b+N0W
;BS m offers ABS; (2a)
hmu;bP
Rx
m;u^m(b)
P IFIm;u;b+N0W
;BS m offers RP-ABS;(2b)
where hmu;b gives the fast fading gain on PRB b from macro
BS m to user u, (b) returns the subframe index of PRB b, Im
denotes the set of BSs whose transmission will interfere the
users located in the same hexagon as macro BS m, P IFIm;u;b is
the sum of interference at user u received from BSs in Im at
PRB b, N0 denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
spectral density and W is the bandwidth of a PRB. Similarly,
the SINR of user u on PRB b when associated with pico BS
p is given by:
SINRpu;b =
hpu;bP
Rx
p;u
P IFIp;u;b +N0W
; (3)
where a pico BS does not offer ABS/RP-ABS as discussed
before. Let ru;b be the achieved rate of user u at PRB b,
where b 2 [1; NB ]. It is assumed that the serving BS knows
4the achieved rate of user u at PRB b, and the achieved rate is
calculated by Shannon’s capacity formula, i.e.,
ru;b =
(
W  log2(1 + SINRmu;b); g(u;Ou) = m 2M;
W  log2(1 + SINRpu;b); g(u;Ou) = p 2 P:
Table I summarizes the notation used in this paper.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let xu;b be a binary variable indicating whether PRB b
is allocated to user u by its serving BS, where xu;b = 1
means that PRB b is allocated to user u and xu;b = 0 means
otherwise. To discriminate the importance of different users,
positive weighting factors are applied, where we denote wu as
the weighting factor for user u.
We formulate the eICIC optimization problem as follows
MAXPFUTILITY-I
maximize
X
i2M[P
X
u2Ui
wuln
XNB
b=1
(xu;bru;b); (4a)
subject to
X
u2Um
xu;b=m((b));
8m2Mc; b2[1; NB ]; m2A; (4b)X
u2Up
xu;b=1; 8p2Pc; b2[1; NB ]; (4c)
xu;b2f0; 1g; 8u2U ; b2[1; NB ]; (4d)
(i)2C; 8i2Pc; (4e)
where (4b) specifies that a macro BS can adopt one of the ABS
patterns in A and only non-ABS PRBs can be assigned to the
users such that at most one user can occupy a PRB, (4c) states
that all PRBs from pico BSs can be allocated to the users and
at most one user can occupy a PRB, and (4e) means that a
pico BS can adopt one of the CSB values specified in C.
For the FeICIC optimization in which macro BSs may offer
RP-ABSs, we aim at solving the following problem
MAXPFUTILITY-II
maximize
X
i2M[P
X
u2Ui
wuln
XNB
b=1
(xu;bru;b); (5a)
subject to ^m(b)2[0; 1]; (b)2A^; 8m2Mc; (5b)
^m(b)=1; (b)2f1; 2; :::; NT gnA^;8m2Mc; (5c)X
u2Ui
xu;b=1; 8i2Mc[Pc; b2[1; NB ]; (5d)
(4d) and (4e);
where (5b) means that power allocation is optimized on PRBs
whose subframe indices are in A^ and (5c) means that no power
optimization is performed on PRBs whose subframe indices
are not in A^. Because there is no restriction on a macro BS
that it must completely mute its transmission on a subframe
in FeICIC optimization, every PRB from a macro BS can be
allocated to at most one user as specified in (5d).
The objective functions of both (4) and (5) are defined as
the sum of logarithm of users’ throughputs. Such an objective
achieves the proportional fairness among the users’ achiev-
able rates, which strikes a good trade-off between aggregate
network throughput and user fairness [17]. Also, different
realizations of  will affect the elements in fUiji2Pcg, which
is how CSB optimization comes into the problems (4) and (5).
TABLE I: Summary of notation.
Notation Description
m ABS pattern of macro BS m
^m RP-ABS pattern of macro BS m
 Vector specifying CSB values of all BSs
Ou Vector specifying CSB values of BSs in Ou
g(u;Ou ) The BS that user u is associated with
mi The macro BS located in the same hexagon as an object
with index i, where the object can be a user or a pico BS
ru;b Achieved rate of user u at PRB b
(b) The subframe index of PRB b
wu Weighting factor on the achieved rate of UE u
xu;b Indicator of whether user u occupies PRB b of the
serving cell
N0 Noise power spectral density
NB Number of PRBs
NF Number of RBs (in frequency domain)
NT Number of subframes (in time domain)
Vi The payoff function of player i
W Bandwidth per RB
A Set of vectors from which macro BSs can
choose their ABS patterns
A^ Set containing indices of subframes which can be ABSs
C Set of CSB values from which a pico BS can choose from
Im Set of BSs whose transmissions interfere the users
located in the same hexagon as BS m
L The set of players in the potential game model
M Set of all macro BSs
Mc Set of macro BSs in the center cluster
N (i; n) The set of BS i’s neighboring BSs located in the
n-th layer of hexagons w.r.t. the hexagon that contains i
Ou Candidate BSs who can serve user u
P Set of all pico BSs
Pc Set of pico BSs in the center cluster
Si The strategy set of player i
U Set of all users in the system
Ui Set of users associated with BSs in set i or with BS i
We now show the NP-hardness of (4) and (5).
Theorem 1. Both (4) and (5) are NP-hard.
Proof: Consider the case where no ABS/RP-ABS is
applied in any macro BS and all pico BSs fix their CSB values
to zeros, and assume there is only one element in Mc [ Pc.
We then obtain a special case for both (4) and (5) where the
only problem left is to decide how to allocate the PRBs of a
single BS. We denote this special case as:
PRB-ALLOCATION
maximize
X
u2Ui
wu  ln
XNB
b=1
(xu;b  ru;b); (6a)
subject to
X
u2Ui
xu;b = 1; b 2 [1; NB ]; (6b)
xu;b 2 f0; 1g; 8u 2 Ui; b 2 [1; NB ]: (6c)
It is shown in [18] that (6) is NP-hard. Therefore, both (4) and
(5) are NP-hard because a special case of the two problems is
NP-hard.
In the next section, we propose a potential game based
framework which can be applied to both (4) and (5) to solve
the problems distributedly and heuristically.
IV. EXACT POTENTIAL GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we frame the eICIC and FeICIC optimization
problems as exact potential games. Our approach is motivated
5by the successful application of potential games to another
scenario in [19] for BS power control and user association.
A. Preliminary
A finite game consists of a finite set of players, a finite
set of strategies of each player, and the payoff functions of
the players, where the payoff of a player is a function of the
strategies played by all the players. A strategy profile gives the
strategies adopted by all the players, and a Nash equilibrium
is a strategy profile s such that no player can improve its
payoff by playing a different strategy than the one specified
in s while other players keep their strategies same.
A game is called an exact potential game if there exists an
exact potential function such that change in the value of the
exact potential function due to a change of a player’s strategy
is the same as the change of the player’s payoff. In a finite
exact potential game, a Nash equilibrium can be achieved if
players take turns randomly and play their best responses or
better responses [20], where, given that all other players fix
their strategies,
1) A best response is a player strategy that maximizes the
player’s payoff function.
2) A better response is a player strategy that improves the
payoff function of the player.
As demonstrated later, that being able to formulate the eICIC
and FeICIC optimization problems as exact potential games
will allow us to solve them distributively using simple algo-
rithms based on best/better response dynamics.
In order to realize the process by which a macro BS adapts
its ABS/RP-ABS pattern when a pico BS in the same hexagon
optimizes its CSB value, it is convenient to define a player
as a union of a macro BS and the pico BSs within the same
hexagon. Let L be the set of players, where each element in L
consists of a set that contains the macro BS and the pico BSs in
a hexagon in the center cluster. We can then denote the game as
  , hL; fSi : i 2 Lg; fVi; : i 2 Lgi, where Si is the strategy
set of player i and Vi is the payoff function of player i. Note
that the game structure   can be applied to both eICIC and
FeICIC optimization problems because the two problems have
the same players and the same objective functions. The only
difference between the eICIC optimization and the FeICIC
optimization is the power allocation constraint on the PRBs,
and this difference can be captured by the definitions of the
respective strategy sets. The details of the strategy sets and
payoff functions will be discussed later.
When a player changes its strategy during the game for
eICIC optimization, users that are associated with the BSs
represented by the player and are associated with other nearby
BSs would be affected. A similar situation applies to the
game for FeICIC optimization. Consequently, to achieve a
good system performance for both (4) and (5), the payoff
function of a player should take users who are located in
nearby hexagons into account, even if these users are not being
served by the player. On the other hand, the transmission of
a BS can, in theory, interfere users located very far away.
To ensure accuracy, the payoff function of a player should
then consider all users in the system. However, such a payoff
function will introduce high complexity to the optimization
process and at the same time deviate from the intention of
designing a distributed algorithm. Some approximation on
the interference is necessary for a low complexity distributed
algorithm. It is therefore important to first identify the impact
of changing ABS/RP-ABS and CSB patterns before defining
a payoff function that leads to an exact potential game and
facilitates low-complexity distributed designs.
In the following, we first discuss which neighboring BSs
of player i can be affected by changes in player i’s CSB
values2. We then define the payoff function of players and
identify an exact potential function based on some interference
approximation. Details of the strategy sets, the algorithms that
converge to a Nash equilibrium, and the downlink schedulers
will be given in later sections.
B. Neighboring sets of a player
As mentioned in previous discussion, for scalability, we
make an approximation that the interference range of a BS
is limited only to some of its neighboring hexagons, because
the interference power from a BS to a user is negligible if the
user is located far away from the BS. We use N IFi to specify
the set of BSs whose hexagons are interfered by player i. More
precisely, it means that a user is interfered by the transmission
of the BSs represented by player i if and only if he is located
in the hexagon of a BS that belongs to N IFi .
Let NAtti contains the BSs whose user attachment patterns
depend on the CSB values of the pico BSs represented by
player i. Clearly, the actual serving BS of a user depends on
the CSB values of the pico BSs represented by player i, if a
BS represented by player i is a candidate serving BS of that
user. Moreover, because user u can be attached to any BS
in Ou, the actual serving BS of user u depends on the CSB
values of all BSs in Ou. Therefore,
NAtti =
[
f8ujfigOug
Ou: (7)
The next proposition shows which elements constitute NAtti .
Proposition 1. N Atti = i [N (i; 1) [N (i; 2):
Proof: See Appendix A.
Define the utility of player i as
Ui(s) ,
X
u2Ui
wu  ln
XNB
b=1
(xu;b  ru;b); (8)
where s is the strategy vector that specifies the strategies
played by all players. Let Ni contain player i and player i’s
neighboring BSs whose downlink users’ SINRs and/or whose
user attachment patterns can be affected by changing the
ABS/RP-ABS patterns and CSB values of player i. The next
proposition shows the elements in Ni when N IFi = i[N (i; 1).
Proposition 2. Suppose i 2 L and N IFi = i[N (i; 1). Keeping
s i unchanged, changes in si may affect Uj only if j 2 N Atti .
In other words, Ni = N Atti .
Proof: See Appendix B.
2More accurately, by changes of the CSB values of the pico BSs represented
by player i.
6The approximation on the interference range, i.e., the def-
inition of N IFi , is crucial to the constitution of Ni. This is
demonstrated in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose i  L and N IFi = i [ N (i; 1) [ fjg,
where j 2 N (i; 2), then N Atti  Ni.
Proof: See Appendix C.
C. Exact potential game formulation
The key to the exact potential game formulation lies in
the appropriate definition of the payoff function. We first
define some notations regarding the strategies of players before
defining the payoff function. Then, we show there exists an
exact potential function with respect to our payoff function.
Let si be the strategy that player i adopts, where si 2 Si.
Define
s i , (s1; :::; si 1; si+1; :::; sjMcj)
to be the strategies of all players other than player i. Denote
(esi; s i) , (s1; :::; si 1; esi; si+1; :::; sjMcj)
as the strategies of all players, where player i selects strategyesi and other players’ strategies are specified as s i. The payoff
function of player i is defined as
Vi(s) ,
X
jNAtti
Uj(s); (9)
and the aggregate utility of all the players is given as
U(s) =
X
i2L Ui(s): (10)
In the following theorem, we show that when N IFi = i [
N (i; 1), U(s) is an exact potential function.
Theorem 2. If N IFi = i [ N (i; 1), then U() is an exact
potential function of the game  , such that   is an exact
potential game.
Proof: Suppose player i changes its strategy, so that the
strategies played by all players changes from s to (esi; s i).
The change in U() due to this unilateral change of player i’s
strategy is:
U(esi; s i) U(s)
=
X
jL(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s))
=
X
jNAtti
(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s))+ X
jLnNAtti
(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s))
=
X
jNi
(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s))+ X
jLnNi
(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s))
(11a)
=
X
jNi
(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s)) (11b)
=
X
jNAtti
(Uj(esi; s i) Uj(s)) (11c)
=Vi((esi; s i)) Vi(s); (11d)
where (11a) and (11c) follow from Proposition 2, (11b)
follows from the definition of Ni, and (11d) follows from the
definition of the payoff function. Equation (11d) indicates that
the change of U() due to the change of a player’s strategy
is exactly the same the change of the payoff function of that
player. This proves that U() is an exact potential function
of the game  . Consequently,   is an exact potential game
because it admits an exact potential function.
Note that the above potential game framework can also
be used to optimize utility functions other than proportional
fairness. For example, in case the objective function in (4)
and (5) is the sum of all users’ rates, then the same potential
game framework can still be used except that now the utility
function of player i should be
P
u2Ui wu 
PNB
b=1(xu;b  ru;b).
V. STRATEGY SETS AND OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we define the strategy sets of the players for
the eICIC and FeICIC optimizations based on exact potential
game formulations. We also provide the algorithms that solve
the exact potential games for eICIC and FeICIC optimizations.
A. The strategy sets and the algorithm for eICIC
By definition, ru;b is a function of the ABS patterns of
the macro BSs in N IFi and the CSB values of the pico BSs
in NAtti , where i  L. Moreover, xu;b is a function of the
downlink scheduler of the serving BS of user u. Therefore,
the strategy of a player should specify the ABS pattern of
the macro BS represented by player i, the CSB values of the
pico BSs represented by player i, and the way of performing
downlink scheduling.
Suppose user u is attached to BS j in the hexagon of player
i when player i plays si, and the same user is attached to BS
k when player i plays s0i, where BS k is not necessarily in the
hexagon of player i. At this point, user u must be rescheduled
to some PRBs offered by BS k, otherwise Vj(s0i; s i) becomes
minus infinity. Such an outcome will prevent a player from
changing its CSB values, which does not fulfill our objective
of CSB optimization. Also, the PRBs that are assigned to user
u when player i plays si becomes unused when player i plays
s0i. These unused PRBs can be assigned to other users in order
to improve the payoff function of player i. Therefore, it is
necessary for a strategy of player i to provide not only the
scheduling of the BSs in player i but also the scheduling of
BSs in NAtti , so that a strategy that changes user attachment
patterns can have the chance of being a best/better response.
Let  eICIC' , hL; fSeICICi : i 2 Lg; fVi; : i 2 Lgi be the
exact potential game for eICIC optimization using scheduler
', where SeICICi denotes the set of strategies of player i when
eICIC optimization is performed. We have
SeICICi = A C  C      C| {z }
jij 1 times
'(NAtti ); (12)
where jij is the number of BSs in the hexagon of player i,
jij   1 is the number of pico BSs in in the hexagon of player
i, and '(NAtti ) gives the scheduling decision of the BSs in
NAtti using scheduler '.
The best response dynamics solves an exact potential game
by iteratively finding the strategies that maximize the payoff
functions of the players selected in each iteration. From the
definition in (12), we can see that the size of the strategy
7set for eICIC optimization scales up quickly as the number
of pico BSs in a hexagon increases. In order to reduce the
complexity in each iteration of the best response dynamics, we
use better response dynamics where only one pico BS’s CSB
value will be optimized in each iteration. Although, in general,
better response dynamics cannot improve the payoff function
of a player as much as best response dynamics does, better
response dynamics also reaches a Nash equilibrium [20]. We
therefore propose the following eICIC optimization algorithm
based on exact potential game formulation:
I-1. Randomly select a player i from L.
I-2. Randomly select a pico BS p in the set of BSs repre-
sented by player i.
I-3. Denote the macro BS in the hexagon of player i as m.
For all possible elements in A C, perform scheduling
for all BSs in NAtti using scheduler ' and evaluate Vi.
Select the element in A C that maximizes Vi.
I-4. Repeat the above steps until some stopping criterion is
met.
The objective function in (4) will be improved when the above
better response dynamic is carried out, because the aggregate
utility of  eICIC improves as a result of improved payoff
function of each selected player during the better response
dynamic. Therefore, the steps from I-1 to I-4 optimize (4)
heuristically.
B. The strategy sets and the algorithm for FeICIC
Similar to the eICIC optimization, the strategy of a player
should contain the RP-ABS pattern of the macro BS in the
selected player, the CSB pattern of a randomly selected pico
BS in the hexagon of the selected player, and the scheduling
decision of the BSs in NAtti . On the other hand, because
in FeICIC optimization, the transmission power level in a
RP-ABS can take a fractional value, it is impossible to
exhaustively search all possible transmission power levels for
each RP-ABS.
Let (b) 2 A^, and assume that macro BS m belongs to
player i which is chosen to perform FeICIC optimization. Let
u be the index of the user who occupies PRB b from macro
BS m, and let U IFm;b be the set of users who are interfered by
the transmission of macro BS m and who are using the b-th
PRBs offered by their respective serving BSs. Fixing macro
BSm’s transmission power on PRBs other than b, we optimize
macro BS m’s transmission power on PRB b by solving the
following problem
POWERALLOCATION
maximize
^m(b)
wu ln
 
log2(1+SINR
m
u;b)+r
 b
u

+
X
v2U IFm;b

wv ln
 
log2(1+SINR
j
v;b)+r
 b
v

; (13a)
subject to 0^m(b)1; (13b)
where r bu gives user u’s rate obtained from PRBs other than
b in case user u has been allocated to more than one PRB and
SINRjv;b =
hjv;b  PRxj;v;b
^m(b)  PRxm;v + P IFIpnfmg;v;b +N0 W
; (14)
where PRxj;v;b is the received signal power of user v at PRB b
from its serving BS j and PRxm;v gives the interference power
from macro BS m to user v when macro BS m is transmitting
at its maximum power. Note that the index j in (14) is an
element from Ni, where i is the index of the chosen player.
Also, without loss of generality, we assume that PRxj;v;b > 0,
since we can remove user v from U IFm;b if PRxj;v;b = 0.
The objective function of (13) is chosen to be in line with
the objective function of (5) so that when (13) is optimized the
objective function of (5) will also increase. Also, all variables
in (13) are known except ^m(b). The next theorem shows the
nature of the objective function of (13).
Theorem 3. Equation (13a) is the difference between
two convex functions, where the two convex functions
are
P
v2U IFm;b

wv ln
 
log2(1 + SINR
j
v;b) + r
 b
v

and
 wu ln
 
log2(1 + SINR
m
u;b) + r
 b
u

.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Because of Theorem 3, (13) can be solved by the convex-
concave procedure (CCP) which converges to a stationary
point [21]. Let 1(^m(b)) , wu ln
 
log2(1+SINR
i
u;b)+r
 b
u

and 2(^m(b)) ,
P
v2U IFm;b

wv ln
 
log2(1 + SINR
j
v;b) +
r bv

. Also, denote ^m(b) as the value of ^m(b) in the -
th iteration in the CCP. The CCP algorithm is described in
Algorithm 1, where 02(^m(b)) is the first derivative of 2
w.r.t. ^m(b) and it is given in (15) at the top of the next page.
Note that step 4 in Algorithm 1 involves solving a convex
problem which can be easily solved by standard software tools.
Algorithm 1 Convex-concave procedure (CCP)
1:  := 0, give ^m(b) an initial value from the interval [0; 1].
2: repeat
3: Define ^2
 
^m(b); ^

m(b)

, 2
 
^m(b)

+
02
 
^m(b)
 
^m(b)  ^m(b)

.
4: Set the value of ^m(b) to be the solution of the
following problem
minimize
^m(b)
  1(^m(b))  ^2
 
^m(b); ^

m(b)

;
subject to 0  ^m(b)  1:
5:  :=  + 1.
6: until some stopping criterion is met.
We are now ready to describe the FeICIC optimization
algorithm based on the exact potential game formulation:
II-1. Randomly select a player i from L. Denote the macro
BS in player i as m.
II-2. Randomly select a pico BS p from the set of BSs
represented by player i.
II-3. For each possible CSB values of pico BS p,
a) Perform scheduling for all stations in NAtti using
scheduler ', assuming that it transmits at full
power on all PRBs.
b) For each element in fbj(b) 2 A^g, perform power
optimization on macro BS m’s transmission power
by solving (13).
802(^m(b)) =  
X
v2U IFm;b
1;v2;vwv
(2;v^m(b) + 3;v)(2;v^m(b) + 3;v + 1;v)
 
ln(1 +
1;v
2;v^m(b)+3;v
) + ln(2)r bv
 ; (15)
where 1;v , hju;bPRxj;u;b, 2;v , PRxm;u, and 3;v , P IFIpnfmg;u;b +N0W .
c) Perform scheduling for all stations in NAtti using
the scheduler ' and evaluate Vi.
II-4. Select the strategy of player i that maximizes Vi.
II-5. Repeat the above steps until some stopping criterion is
met.
The steps from II-1 to II-5 optimize (5) heuristically, because
the aggregate utility of  FeICIC improves as the game is being
played.
C. Implementation in practice
In LTE-A systems, a user’s association is determined by the
received signal strength and the offset value (i.e., CSB value
in our context) from each of the candidate BSs. The offset
values are stored in the system information blocks (SIBs)
which are defined and broadcast to the users by the evolved
universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN), i.e., by
the BSs [22, Chapters 2 and 3]. A user continuously measures
the channel conditions of its nearby BSs and reports these
measurements to its serving BS. When a BS offers ABSs,
a user served by the BS may find if a nearby pico BS has a
better channel condition than its serving BS. Such information
can be utilized by the serving BS to decide whether the CSB
values should be updated so that a handover can be performed.
After accessing the interference situation of its users, a BS
may request a neighboring BS for ABSs using an “Invoke
Indication” message via the X2 interface. The BS that receives
such a request may then configure its ABS pattern and
inform its neighboring BSs such that the latter may perform
scheduling based on the new ABS pattern [22, Chapters 31].
Also, BSs can adjust and coordinate the ABS patterns based
on the “ABS Status” messages exchanged among them.
We can see that the LTE-A standards have prescribed
signaling that allows FeICIC/eICIC optimizations to be carried
out in a distributed manner. Via the signaling from neighboring
BSs and the measurement reports from the users, a BS is able
to know the interference situations of its users and the users
served by nearby BSs. A BS can then decide how to adjust
ABS/RP-ABS and CSB patterns for performance optimization.
The realization of the distributed optimizations is a design
issue which is not standardized. Our proposed game theoretic
framework provides distributed algorithms for eICIC/FeICIC
optimizations and can be supported by the existing LTE-A
standards. More specifically, the better response dynamics for
eICIC/FeICIC optimizations are in the spirit of distributed
optimization, since each player uses only local information
to drive the overall system to optimality. In particular, each
player is able to evaluate the impact of his strategy on his
neighboring player’s utilities. All this is possible thanks to
the availability of the aforementioned signaling over the X2
interface.
VI. DOWNLINK SCHEDULERS
We now present the downlink schedulers that can be the
potential candidates for '.
A. Round-Robin (RR) Scheduler
When using the RR scheduler, the available PRBs of a BS
are allocated to the associated users in turns. For example,
suppose a BS has five available PRBs labeled as PRB1, PRB2,
..., and PRB5, and two users are associated with the BS, then
user 1 will get PRB1, PRB3, and PRB5, and user 2 will get
PRB2 and PRB4. Note that a macro BS’s PRBs that are ABSs
will not be allocated to any user.
B. PF Scheduler
The b-th PRB of a BS will be allocated to the following
user [22]: bub , argmax
u2Ui
ru;b
ru((b))
; (16)
where (b) gives the subframe index of the b-th PRB and the
underlying assumption is that subframe (b) is not an ABS,
b 2 [1; NB ], and ru(t) is the long-term average throughput of
user u in subframe (b) which is calculated as:
ru((b)) = (1  1tc )ru((b)  1)
+ 1tc
P
febj(eb)=(b)g ru;eb  1fbub = ug: (17)
In (17), tc is the time window which is a design parameter
and 1fg is the indicator function. The performance of this
scheduler has been evaluated in several scenarios; see [23].
C. Convex Scheduler
Given a strategy of player i, we wish to maximize the utility
function of the players in Ni as defined in (8) subject to the
constraints (4b), (4c) and (4d). This problem is the same as
(6) and it is, unfortunately, NP-hard as stated in Theorem 1.
On the other hand, we can relax the binary constraint in (6)
to reduce the complexity of solving the problem. For example,
considering pico BS p, we can relax the integer constraint in
(4d) and formulate the following problem
PRB-ALLOCATION-RELAXED
maximize
X
u2Up
wu  ln
XNB
b=1
(gxu;b  ru;b); (18a)
subject to 0  gxu;b  1; 8u 2 Up; b 2 [1; NB ]; (18b)X
u2Up
gxu;b = 1; b 2 [1; NB ]: (18c)
In (18), gxu;b represents the fraction of PRB b allocated to user
u. We make the following observations:
(a) The objective function of (18) is concave. To see this,
notice that ln
PNB
b=1(gxu;b  ru;b) is a concave function
9of a linear combination of fgxu;bjb 2 [1; NB ]g. There-
fore, the objective function of RELAXEDALLOCATION
is also concave because it is a nonnegative summation
of concave functions [24].
(b) The constraints of (18) are linear.
As a result, (18) is a concave optimization problem, and it can
be solved by using standard convex optimization solvers. Let
the matrix XRelaxed be the solution to (18), where its (u; b)-
th entry, XRelaxedu;b , gives the fraction of the b-th PRB that is
allocated to user u. To get an allocation pattern that satisfies
the constraints of MAXPFUTILITY, we need to quantize
XRelaxed. Also, we need to make sure that every user gets at
least one PRB after quantization, because the utility function
in (8) evaluates to minus infinity if no PRB is allocated to a
user, which contradicts with the goal of maximizing the utility
function. The quantization can be done in the following steps:
1) For each column of XRelaxed, set the largest element in
the column to one and other elements to zeros. Denote
the resultant matrix as XQuan..
2) If there exists a zero row in XQuan.:
a) Denote all columns of XQuan. as free columns.
b) Randomly select a zero row in XQuan., e.g., row u.
c) LetXu;b be the largest element in row u ofXRelaxed
where column b is still a free column in XQuan.. Set
XQuan.u;b to one and every other element in column
b of XQuan. to zeros.
d) Remove column b from the free column list. Repeat
steps b) and c) if there still exists a zero row in
XQuan..
The above quantization ensures that the PRB allocation con-
straints in (4) and (4) are satisfied, and at the same time each
user gets at least one PRB.
The scheduler for a macro BS is similar and therefore its
details are omitted for brevity. The only difference is that PRBs
that are configured as ABSs are not allocated to any user.
D. Cake-Cutting Scheduler
We now present a method that solves (18). We use the fact
that the solution to (18) leads to a price equilibrium to the
following PRICEEQUILIBRIUM problem [25, Chapter 8.5]:
PRICEEQUILIBRIUM. Let ru;b be nonnegative real numbers,
where u 2 Ui; b 2 [1; NB ]. The real vector (1; 2; :::; NB )
is called an equilibrium price vector and the nonnegative real
vectors f(gxu;1;gxu;2; :::; x^u;NB )ju 2 Uig are called equilibrium
bundles, if P
b b =
P
u wu; (19a)
fgxu;bj8bg maximize Pb(gxu;b  ru;b);8u; (19b)
subject to
P
b b  gxu;b  wu; 8u; (19c)P
u gxu;b = 1;8b: (19d)
The intuition for PRICEEQUILIBRIUM is as follows. There
are NB goods in the market each with price b, where b 2
[1; NB ]. User u has budget wu and he is allowed to buy a
nonnegative portion of any good. ru;b gives the utility of the
b-th good to user u. A price equilibrium is the set of prices of
the goods so that all users spend all their budgets, all goods
are sold out, and under these conditions all users maximize
their own utilities.
Let fxu;bj8u; bg be the solution to (18). It is proved in
[18] that a price equilibrium of PRICEEQUILIBRIUM gives
an optimal solution to (18).
Theorem 4. A solution of PRICEEQUILIBRIUM gives an
optimal solution to (18).
Proof: See [18].
The PRICEEQUILIBRIUM problem can be solved by the
algorithm proposed in [26]. The algorithm works by iteratively
adjusting the prices of the goods and assumes that a user only
buys the goods that have the largest utilities to him. Each
iteration of the algorithm involves solving a max flow problem
in a single-source single-sink directed graph where the edges
are weighted, and therefore an iteration takes polynomial time.
The algorithm terminates within finite iterations, though [26]
does not provide an upper bound on the number of iterations.
In the simulation section, we will compare the run time of the
cake-cutting PF scheduler to that of the convex PF scheduler.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We perform simulation studies on FeICIC and eICIC op-
timizations by randomly generating 100 HetNet topologies
and then averaging the performance indicators from all the
topologies. In the center cluster of each topology, a number
of pico BSs and 20 users are placed inside each hexagon in
the center cluster, where the pico BSs are randomly placed.
Moreover, in each hexagon in the center cluster, 10 users
are randomly placed within 100 meters of the pico BSs in
the same hexagon3. The distances between different BSs and
the distances between BSs and users are constrained by the
minimum distance requirements as specified in Table II. The
six surrounding clusters of the center cluster are exact copies
of the center cluster. Other parameters regarding the generation
of a random HetNet are also shown in Table II. We assume that
the users are static. Also, each PRB experiences independent
Rayleigh fading with variance 1. The shadow fading in dB
from a BS to a user is calculated by adding a common
shadowing value and a random shadowing value and then
dividing the sum by
p
2, where both shadowing values are
generated according to log-normal distribution [27]4.
The parameters of the problems (4) and (5) for simulations
are configured as follows. The weighting factors of all users
are set to be 1, i.e., wu = 1 for all u.NT is set to be 10 andNF
is set to be 3. Fig. 2 shows all the possible ABS patterns. Also,
the CSB values that a pico BS can adopt are given in Table II.
For conciseness, in the rest of the figures, we use “Nil” to
represent the case where neither eICIC nor FeICIC is carried
out, “Exact” to represent the case whereN IFi = i[N (i; 1), and
“Non-exact” to represent N IFi = i[N (i; 1)[N (i; 2)[N (i; 3).
Moreover, we use the terms cell and hexagon interchangeably.
3If there exists more than one pico BS, then the 10 users are equally divided
into a number of groups which is the same as the number of pico BSs, and
one and only one group of users are randomly placed near a pico BS.
4This is to create correlations among shadow fading.
5Min. dist. stands for minimum distance.
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Fig. 2: ABS patterns that can be chosen by a macro BS.
TABLE II: Parameters for generating HetNet topologies [27].
Parameter Value
Inter-macro-BS distance 1000 m
Min. dist.5 from macro BS to user 35 m
Min. dist. from pico BS to user 10 m
Min. dist. from macro BS to pico BS 75 m
Antenna per site Omnidirectional  1
Macro BS power 40 W
Pico BS Power 1 W
Noise density -174 dBm/Hz
Noise figure 9 dB
Duration per subframe 1 ms
Bandwidth per RB 180 kHz
CSB values C := f0; 3; 6; 9; 12; 15g dB
Log-normal shadowing 10 dB
standard deviation
Path loss from macro BS to user 128:1 + 37:6 log10 d, d in km
Path loss from pico BS to user 140:7 + 36:7 log10 d, d in km
Fig. 3 shows the EE of different optimization schemes in
the center cluster, where the EE is calculated as the number of
transmitted bits divided by the transmission energy. We can see
that eICIC optimization largely improves the EE and FeICIC
optimization further enhances the EE. Specifically, when the
PF scheduler is used and there are three pico BSs in each
hexagon, eICIC can offer about 64% improvement compared
to the no-optimization case and FeICIC can offer about 92%
compared to the no-optimization case. Moreover, compared to
the no-optimization case, eICIC and FeICIC can offer more
gain on EE when there are more pico BSs in each hexagon.
Fig. 3: EE of the center cluster for various topology settings.
Fig. 4: SE of the center cluster for various topology settings.
Fig. 5: Jain’s fairness indices of the users’ achieved rates in
the center cluster for various topology settings.
Fig. 4 shows the SE of different optimization schemes in the
center cluster, where the SE is defined as the average trans-
mitted bits per second per Hz of all allocated PRB. Although
the SE after FeICIC optimization using PF scheduler may be
slightly (around 1% in general) less than the SE after eICIC
optimization, FeICIC optimization should still be treated as
a better scheme than eICIC optimization because compared
to eICIC optimization, FeICIC optimization offers significant
gain on EE, offers better fairness when PF scheduler is used
as shown in Fig. 5, and offers better worst 5% user’s achieved
rates as shown in Fig. 6.
Fig. 6 plots the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
the users’ achieved rates which are in the worst 5% range
of all users’ achieved rates6, where the PF scheduler is used
and each hexagon has one pico BS. We can see that eICIC
optimization can improve the median value of the worst 5%
users’ achieved rates by about 30%, and FeICIC can further
6This is also commonly referred to as the cell-edge throughput.
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Fig. 6: The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the worst
5% users’ achieved rates in the center cluster, where the PF
scheduler is used and each hexagon has one pico BS.
Fig. 7: Aggregate utilities of the games  FeICIC and  eICIC,
where there are 3 pico BSs in each hexagon.
improve the median value by about 15%.
Fig. 7 plots the averaged global utilities of the games  FeICIC
and  eICIC when both RR and PF schedulers are used, where
three pico BSs are placed in each hexagon. We can see that the
better response dynamics proposed in Sections V-A and V-B
can optimize the problems (4) and (5) heuristically because
the global utilities increase as the games are being played.
The results in Fig. 3 to Fig. 7 are obtained when player i
only interferes near-by users, i.e., N IFi = i[N (i; 1). In reality,
however, the interference from a BS can reach farther. Suppose
we count the interference from BSs in
S4
n=0N (mu; n) to
user u as all the interference user u suffers from, where no
ABS/RP-ABS or CSB is applied. Table III summarizes the
averaged interference power to a user from the neighboring
cells. The definition of N IFi = i[N (i; 1) takes 95.38% of the
total interference into account.
To see the impact of interference approximation, we com-
pare the performance of the game theoretic optimization
schemes when N IFi = i [ N (i; 1) and N IFi = i [ N (i; 1) [
TABLE III: Average interference to user u from neighboring
BSs.
N (mu; 0) N (mu; 2) N (mu; 3) N (mu; 4)
[N (mu; 1)
Interference -106.59 -122.42 -124.70 -128.17
Power (dB)
Percentage 95.38% 2.49% 1.47% 0.66%
Fig. 8: EE when there are two pico BSs in each hexagon.
N (i; 2)[N (i; 3), where i is a player in the games  FeICIC and
 eICIC. Note that when N IFi = i[N (i; 1)[N (i; 2)[N (i; 3),
the games  FeICIC and  eICIC will no longer be exact potential
games because (11c) is no longer true. For the scenario where
there are two pico BSs in each hexagon, we plot the EE, the
SE, and the Jain’s fairness indices after FeICIC optimization in
Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig. 10, respectively, where in those figures,
“Exact” represent the case when N IFi = i[N (i; 1) and “Non-
exact” represent the case when N IFi = i[N (i; 1)[N (i; 2)[
N (i; 3). We can see that although the performances of the
optimization schemes are over-estimated by the assumption of
N IFi = i[N (i; 1), the performance gains achieved by FeICIC
compared to the no-optimization case is accurately predicted.
The performance of the cake-cutting scheduler is compared
with RR scheduler and PF scheduler in Fig. 8, Fig. 9, and Fig.
10. We can observe that the cake-cutting scheduler can lead to
better performance on EE, SE, and fairness compared to the
other schedulers. Specifically, when FeICIC is performed, the
cake-cutting scheduler has approximately an 11% gain on EE
and approximately a 10% gain on SE.
Table IV shows the average MATLAB simulation run time
for each macro BS to perform downlink scheduling using
different schedulers, where it is assumed that no pico BS
is present and each macro BS serves exactly 10 users. The
MATLAB version is R2013a, and the simulation is performed
on a laptop equipped with an Intel i5-4200U CPU using
single thread. For the convex scheduler, we compare all the
four available convex solvers in MATLAB’s built-in function
“fmincon”, and we record the run time of the fastest solver. We
observe that the scheduling decisions resulted from the convex
scheduler are almost the same as those from the cake-cutting
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Fig. 9: SE when there are two pico BSs in each hexagon.
Fig. 10: Jain’s fairness indices of users’ achieved rates when
there are two pico BSs in each hexagon.
scheduler, but the averaged run time of the convex scheduler is
about 20 times as long as that of the cake-cutting scheduler.
Although the PF scheduler and the RR scheduler run faster
than the cake-cutting PF scheduler, the cake-cutting scheduler
gives better performance in terms of EE, SE, and fairness in
users’ achieved rates.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed distributed algorithms based
on the exact potential game framework to optimize FeICIC and
eICIC in LTE-A HetNets. Through simulation studies, we have
TABLE IV: Comparison on downlink schedulers’ run time.
Scheduler Average Run Time per BS
Convex 7.5275 seconds
Cake-cutting 0.3860 seconds
PF tc = 5 0.0045 seconds
RR 0.0018 seconds
demonstrated that eICIC optimization can improve the EE of
the network by 64% while FeICIC optimization can improve
the EE by about 92%. In addition, FeICIC can offer better
fairness in users’ throughputs and can also yield significant
cell-edge throughput gains compared to eICIC. Furthermore,
we have shown that a cake-cutting algorithm can be used as a
downlink scheduler to offer better EE, SE, and fairness among
users compared to conventional PF schedulers while being
much more computationally efficient than the conventional
convex-solvers.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Given a user u:
1) Suppose mu = j, where j 2 i, then user u can be
associated with any BSs in Ou = i [N (i; 0) [N (i; 1)
for any CSB values that the pico BSs represented by
player i takes.
2) Suppose mu 2 N (i; 1) and g(u;Ou) = j, where j 2 i.
If we change Ou(j), then:
a) Depending on the CSB value of BS i, user u can be
associated with a BS in N (i; 2) because N (i; 2)\
Ou 6= ; and i  Ou.
b) User u cannot be associated with any BS in
N (i; x), where x  3. The reason is that N (i; x)\
Ou = ;, for x  3.
3) Suppose mu 2 N (i; x), where x  2. In this case, the
change of CSB values of player i will not affect the
association of user u because player i is not in Ou.
Summarizing the above three scenarios, we can conclude that
NAtti = i [N (i; 0) [N (i; 1) [N (i; 2).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Suppose player i changes its strategy from si to s0i. We can
easily see that if the difference between si and s0i includes
the scheduling decision, then the scheduling change will only
affect Ui. Therefore, we can decouple the effect of scheduling
change and the following three cases are sufficient to deter-
mine which players’ utility functions will be affected:
C-1. If si and s0i differs by the ABS/RP-ABS pattern only,
then users who are located in the same hexagons as BSs
in N IFi will have their achieved rates changed, while
these users can be attached to BSs in i [ N (i; 1) [
N (i; 2) = NAtti . Therefore, utilities of players in NAtti
may be changed in this case.
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C-2. If si and s0i differs by the CSB patterns only, and
consequently user u’s serving BS is changed from n
to j, then the utilities of the players where BS n and
BS j belong to will be changed and mu 2 i [ N (i; 1).
Moreover:
a) If mu 2 i, then n 2 Ou  NAtti and j 2 i [
N (i; 1)  NAtti .
b) If mu 2 N (i; 1), then fn; jg 2 Ou  i[N (i; 1)[
N (i; 2). In other words, fn; jg 2 NAtti .
C-3. Suppose si and s0i differs by both the ABS/RP-ABS and
the CSB patterns, and consequently user u’s serving BS
is changed from n to j. From the analysis of C-1, we
know that users who are interfered by player i can only
be attached to BSs in NAtti . From the analysis of C-2,
we know that a user may only change its serving BS
from a BS in NAtti to another BS in NAtti . Therefore,
the changes of ABS and CSB patterns will only affect
the utilities of players in NAtti .
Summarizing the above arguments, we can conclude that only
Uj can be changed if si is changed to s0i, where j  NAtti .
The statement that Ni = NAtti given that N IFi = i[N (i; 1)
is readily true by the definition of Ni.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Suppose user u is located in the same hexagon as BS j.
Then it is possible that user u is attached to a BS in N (i; 3)
because Ou \N (i; 3) 6= ;. This means that N (i; 3)\Ni 6= ;.
Because NAtti \N (i; 3) = ; and by definition NAtti  Ni, we
conclude that NAtti  Ni.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
For brevity of presentation, let  , SINR
m
u;b
^m(b)
. Also, note
that SINRjv;b =
1;v
^m(b)2;v+3;v
, where 1;v , 2;v , and 3;v are
defined in (15). Then, (13a) can be rewritten as
wu ln
 
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
+
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v2U IFm;b

wv ln

log2

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
+ r bv

= C + f1(^m(b)) +
X
v2U IFm;b
f2;v(^m(b)); (21)
where C , ln( 1ln(2) )(wu +
P
v2U IFm;b wv) is a constant,
f1(^m(b)) , wu ln
 
ln (1 + ^m(b)  ) + ln(2)r bu

; (22)
and
f2;v(^m(b)),wv ln

ln

1+
1;v
^m(b)2;v+3;v

+ln(2)r bv

:
(23)
Observe that f1(^m) is concave because wu is non-negative,
ln (1 + ^m(b)  ) + ln(2)r bu is concave and ln() is a non-
decreasing concave function [24, pp. 84].
Next, we argue that f2;v(^m(b)) is convex. The second
derivative of f2;v(^m(b)) w.r.t. ^m(b) is given in (20), where
v = 2 ln(2)2;vr
 b
v ^m(b) + (2 ln(2)3;v + ln(2)1;v) r
 b
v 
0. We now argue that f 002;v(^m(b)) > 0. Let qv ,
1;v
2;v^m(b)+3;v
, where qv > 0 by definition. Then,
1;v
h22;v^m(b)+23;v
1;v
+1

ln(1+
1;v
2;v^m(b)+3;v
) 1
i
=1;v
(2+qv) ln(1+qv) qv
qv
>1;v
(1+qv) ln(1+qv) qv
qv
; (24)
where (24) is true because ln(1 + qv) > 0. Then, notice
that (24) is positive because 1;v > 0 by definition and
(1 + qv) ln(1 + qv)   qv > 0 for qv > 0 for the following
reasons:
1) limqv!0+(1 + qv) ln(1 + qv)  qv = 0.
2) The derivative of (1 + qv) ln(1 + qv)   qv w.r.t. qv is
ln(1+qv) which is larger than zero for qv > 0, meaning
that (1+ qv) ln(1+ qv)  qv is an increasing function of
qv when qv > 0.
Therefore, f 002;v(^m(b)) > 0 because (24) is positive and the
terms 1;v , 2;v , 3;v , and wv are all positive. The fact that
f 002;v(^m(b)) > 0 implies that f2;v(^m(b)) is convex
7 [24].
From (21), (22), and (23), the objective function of (13) can
be rewritten as
C +
X
v2U IFm;b
f2;v(^m(b))  ( f1(^m(b))) ; (25)
where the first term is a constant, the second term is a sum-
mation of convex functions, and the third term  f1(^m(b))
is also convex because f1(^m(b)) is concave. Therefore, the
objective function of (13) is a difference between two convex
functions.
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